Published In

Geschichtstheorie am Werk

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-11-2021

Subjects

History -- Philosophical Inquiry, History -- Pedagogy

Abstract

Realist history does not meet many human needs. History needs a great deal more philosophy, but of what kind?

In his essay on this blog, "Reflections on Theory of History Polyphonic," Ethan Kleinberg suggests that historians often use theory to block change in their work rather than to advance it. One way they do this, he points out, is to include a little theory in order to inoculate themselves against greater and more fundamental challenges. They give or take a blow, and then hoist up their shield, thereby avoiding philosophy and miniaturizing it into "historical theory."

I cannot quantify the resistance that professional historians have shown toward changes of the sort Kleinberg argues for, nor can I add much to a psychology of such defensive historiography. Some historians just avoid philosophy because it’s neither their job, nor their skill, nor their disposition; some have superseding intellectual or moral commitments. Many people from all walks of life simply do not want to be discomfited. As a disciplined young engineer, John Muir was building a clock when a spring in the mechanism popped him in the eyes, temporarily blinding him. While lying in a darkened room for months awaiting the return of his sight, a new vision opened up before him, and he subsequently became one of the great wanderers in American life. Some are clockmakers, some wanderers; most of us try to do our duty while leaving ourselves a certain measure of freedom. Yet good historians are not drudges, as they are highly aware of the complex constitution of any given state of human affairs.

I am more interested in why philosophy avoids history. Is it because of what philosophers do and the way they do it? And what is it that philosophers do that allows some historians to use slivers of conceptual thought to blot out the rest? The almost-forgotten philosopher of history, John W. Miller, said, "To view history philosophically is to consider it as a constitutional mode of experience". It seems to me that the dereliction of the vast existential import of the historical is a great loss. I would like to explore this by commenting on two of Kleinberg’s propositions, in order to argue that understanding history non-realistically provides conceptual strength and ethical values for moral and general philosophy, as well as for human understanding.

Persistent Identifier

https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/36640

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