Published In
De Ethica
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2020
Subjects
Linguistic Narrativism -- theory
Abstract
In this essay we consider the moral claims of one branch of non-realist theory known as linguistic narrativism theory. By highlighting the moral implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue that the “moral vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal normativity in our moral life. With its appeal to volitionism and intuitionism, the ethical sensitivity of this theory enters into difficulties brought about by several internal tensions as to what morality and moral judgements involve. We contend that the proponents of linguistic narrativism theory must strongly recognize and take responsibility for the “moral vison” their theory professes, in so far as they want to think of their theory as a morally responsible one.
Rights
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee: LiU Electronic Press.This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Persistent Identifier
https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/33297
Citation Details
Elgabsi, Natan and Gilbert, Bennett, "On Some Moral Implications of Linguistic Narrativism Theory" (2020). University Studies Faculty Publications and Presentations. 71.
https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/33297
Description
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee: LiU Electronic Press.This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).